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Landlord influence on soil conservation practice adoption
Abstract

The objective of this study is to identify which farm or farmer characteristics explain tenants’ perceptions of whether
landlords are supportive or not of no-till farming and to describe landlords’ attitudes towards tenants switching to notill on their land. Results indicate that size of farm, percentage of the farm in wheat, and having a cash lease were found
to be the most significant variables influencing farmers’ perceptions about landlords’ disposition toward no-till or more
intensive spring cropping. The first two were negatively correlated and the last was positively correlated. Overall,
farmers appeared to be more pessimistic regarding landlords’ acceptance of no-till than were landlords themselves.
Keywords: tenant, landlord, conservation, logit.
JEL Classification: Q50.

Introduction©

In Washington State there has been a long history of
farmland leasing and it has increased slightly in
recent years. The 1997 Census of Agriculture indicated that 44.9% of all farmland in the state was
leased, which was 3.9% more than in 1972 (USDC,
1999). The two dominant farmland leasing arrangements in the state are crop share and cash lease. Under crop share the lessor and lessee agree to share the
yield and certain expenses in specified proportions.
The common crop share lease for wheat is Ҁ of the
crop to the tenant and ѿ to the landlord. While peas
and lentils, are split commonly ¾ and ¼ for tenant
and landlord, respectively. Landlords always pay
100% of the property taxes and sometimes split with
the tenant the herbicide, fertilizer, and/or crop insurance costs in the same proportion as the crop. Crop
share leases share risk between landlord and tenant
because no crop share is paid to the landlord if there
is a crop failure. Cash leases are a fixed monetary
amount per year, due regardless of crop performance.
Cash leases transfer all production risk to the lessee.
Crop share leases are dominant in the dryland cereal
growing region of eastern Washington. A survey by
Willett et al. (1987) showed 86% of all leases were
crop share in Whitman County.
Langemeier (1997) described five basic principles
for a successful crop share lease: (1) yield increasing inputs should be share by tenant and landlord;
(2) share arrangements should be adjusted as technology changes (such as shifts to conservation tillage); (3) total crop returns should be divided in the
same proportion as resources contributed; (4) compensation for long-term investments should occur at
termination through land or other resource value
changes; and (5) good landowner/tenant communication is a key to a successful lease. Willett et al.
(1987) described two objectives of a desirable lease
as: (1) obtaining optimum economic efficiency in
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the use of resources; and (2) equity in allocating
returns between the landowner and lessee.
Burgener and Dillon (1999) studied how technological advances changed the equitable shared lease
in Nebraska. They found that when conservation
tillage and intensive spring cropping were introduced the traditional Ҁ-ѿ share lease for wheatfallow changed to ¾-¼. This provided a fairer return
for the tenant, because of the additional production
expenses associated with intensive cropping systems. The new crop share fairly provided the landowner the same return as under the traditional cropshare. However, inertia in crop shares may slow
environmentally and economically desirable technical changes in farming.
Landlord attitudes have sometimes retarded technical
change in the past (Dillman and Carlson, 1982). Their
survey indicated that 38% of eastern Washingtonnorthern Idaho farmers stated “landlord resistance” as
a moderate or very important reason for farmers not
doing a better job of controlling soil erosion.
In eastern Washington more intensive rotations and
direct seeding are two common conservation practices (Upadhyay et al., 2003). Whitman county
growers have increased no-till farmland from 2.9%
of county farmland in 1989 to 12.1% in 1998
(CTIC, 2001). Landlords will normally contend with
both positive and negative consequences from tenants switching to no-till and intensive spring cropping. For the short run, the landlord’s fractional
share of crop and income may be reduced if crop
shares are split in accordance with the new resource
contributions, and may cause apprehension by the
landlords. However, the annual dollar return to the
landlord may not be reduced as shown by Burgener
and Dillon (1999). In the long run, landlords would
be beneficiaries of improved land quality, which is
protected by conservation tillage. But in the end
landlords may have different attitudes pertaining to
soil quality improvements and different tolerances
in waiting for long-run payoffs.
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Government program changes can also influence landlord and tenant lease negotiations. Since 1985 landlords have had the option of enrolling erodible land in
the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). In return
for planting perennial grass on CRP land for 10 years,
the landlord receives an annual payment from the government. Some prospective tenants have argued that
the CRP has reduced the supply of rentable land and
increased the bargaining terms for landlords.
The objective of this study is to use survey data
from eastern Washington to (1) statistically analyze
which farm or farmer characteristics explain tenants’ perceptions of whether landlords are supportive or not of no-till farming; and (2) describe landlords’ attitudes towards tenants switching to no-till
on their land.
1. Materials and methods

Data for this study came from an exploratory survey
of participants attending field days and farm meetings in Benton, Lincoln, and Whitman Counties in
Washington during early 2003. The sample included
27 completed one-page questionnaires from farmertenants and 11 from landlords. Farmer perceptions
of landlord influence on no-till adoption were ascertained by the question: What do you feel are the
main barriers, and/or encouragements which landlords represent with regard to switching to no-till, or
to more intensive rotations, in your area?
Responses to question (1) were divided into the
binary variable ENCOUR coded (1) indicated they
considered landlords encouraged no-till or discouraged no-till coded (0) (Table 1). For this study “notill” included “no-till or more intensive rotations.” In
a previous large regional survey, the two practices
were adopted together 58% of the time (Upadhyay et
al., 2003). The following farm and farmer characteristics listed in Table 1 were used in the analysis.
LEASE describes whether the farmer has predominantly cash (coded 1) or crop-share (coded 0) leased
land. SIZE represents the size of the farm in acres.
%WHEAT represents the percentage of the farm in
wheat. EDUC represents the farmer’s level of education with 0 indicating high school graduate, 1 if some
college or technical school, and 2 if college graduate.
%RENTED indicates the percent of farm rented.
%RENT_REL indicates the percentage of farmland
rented from relatives.
Table 1. Description of variables used in farmer
survey conducted in 2003
Variable

Unit

Description

(1,0)

1 if landlord encourages adoption, 0 if landlord
discourages

Dependent:
ENCOUR

Independent:

LEASE

(1,0)

1 if lease is cash, 0 if crop-share

SIZE

Acres

Acres

%WHEAT

Percent Percentage of farm in wheat

EDUC

(0,1,2)

0 if high school graduate, 1 if some college or
technical school, 2 if college graduate

%RENTED_REL Percent Percent of farm rented from relatives
%RENTED

Percent Percent of farm rented

The primary attitudinal question in the landlord
questionnaire was “What do you feel are the main
advantages, and/or disadvantages, associated with
your tenants switching either to no-till, or to more
intensive rotations, on your cropland?” Responses to
this question were then used to divide the small
sample of 11 landlords between (1) those where notill or intensive rotations’ advantages predominated
and (2) for those where disadvantages predominated. Agricultural characteristics elicited in the
landlord questionnaire were: would allow change in
crop rents with no-till adoption, lease type (cash or
share, percent), rainfall (inches) on their rented land,
% wheat on their rented land, total acres rented to
others, number of landlords they knew who had notilling renters. Personal characteristics elicited in the
landlord questionnaire were: male or female, age
(years), distance from their home to their rented
farmland (miles), % of their land rented to relatives.
Logit regression analysis was conducted to statistically
measure how closely the different farm and farmer
characteristics were related to the farmers’ perceptions
of how supportive landlords were of no-till. Logit
model places the estimated probabilities inside the
binary 0-1 variable without actually creating probability estimates of 0 or 1 (Kennedy, 1998). The dependent variable was described by a binary ‘ENCOUR’
variable, which represents a tenant’s perception of
landlords’ encouragement or discouragement for a
switch to no-till. In addition to the statistical results,
some verbatim comments of responding farmers are
provided for possible insight and interpretation of tenant’s perception of landlords’ encouragement or discouragement for a switch to no-till. In contrast to the
farmer survey data, no statistical analysis is provided
for the landlord data because of the small number (11)
of respondents. However a descriptive comparison of
means of landlord characteristics for both those considering no-till advantageous and those considering it
disadvantageous is presented.
2. Results and discussion
2.1. Farm and farmer characteristics. Of the 27
farmers surveyed, 44% reported that their landlords
encouraged no-till (Table 2). Current lease terms
were 88% crop-share and 12% cash. Of the respondents, 88% had graduated from college, and two had
a master’s degree and one a doctorate. Farm size
ranged from 650 to 7000 acres with an average of
119
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3344 acres. Average percent of farm in wheat was
54.4%. Percent of farm rented ranged from zero to
100 with a relatively high average of 72.6%. Percent
of farm rented from relatives also ranged from zero
to 100 and with an average of 24.7%.
Table 2. Farm and farmer characteristics
Variable

Value

N

% of 0

% of 1

ENCOUR

(1,0)

27

56

44

LEASE

(1,0)

27

12

88

EDUC

(0,1,2)

27

04

07

% of 2

Categorical:

Continuous:

88

Average

SIZE

Acres

27

%WHEAT

Percent

27

3344.4
54.4

%RENT

Percent

27

72.6

%RENT_REL

Percent

27

24.7

Note: ENCOUR = 0 if landlord discourages adoption or 1 if
encourages. LEASE = 0 if crop-share lease or 1 if cash, EDUC =
0 if highest education is high school, 1 if some college or technical school, 2 if college graduate.

2.2. Producers. Based on the Pearson chi-square,
the equation (Table 3) was statistically significant at
the 10% level when testing the global null hypothesis that all coefficients equal zero. Probability of
landlord encouragement at the mean (Y = 1) is zero.
For this exploratory model with a small sample size,
it was promising to note that farm SIZE was nega-

tively related at the 7.8 percent statistical level to
farmers’ perception of landlords’ supportiveness of
no-till. This suggests a hypothesis that smaller acreage farmers have had a more positive experience
with landlords when adopting no-till, than larger
acreage farmers. Possibly landlords have found that
smaller acreage farmers have had the time to properly manage no-till fields. However, farmers’ comments show there is some diversity of views and
experience within farm size levels and other attributes. One producer with a farm size of 2400 acres,
reports, “My landlords are all older than 65 years
and have been very open and good to deal with
(when switching to no-till).” In contrast, a producer
that farms 3400 acres, (67% wheat with crop-share
leases), stated landlords don’t encourage adoption
no-till because “It doesn’t look as good to them as
cultivation.” A producer that rents all farm land,
farms 4200 acres, 67% wheat and leases half by cropshare and half cash cites that “Not too many barriers
as far as switching to no-till, but more intensive rotations are hard to accomplish when the number one
cash crop is winter wheat and all other crops seldom
breakeven.” Another producer that farms 2000 acres,
that intensively crops 100% wheat under all cropshare leases, responded “Landlords don’t understand
the benefits from direct seeding and worry about
income” as the main barrier to no-till.

Table 3. Logit regression coefficients and their statistical significance
Intercept

EDUC

SIZE

%WHEAT

%RENT

%RENT_REL

LEASE

Coefficient

3.839

-.8545

-.00064

-.0434

-.00954

.0107

2.744

Significance

.2137

.1490

.0780

.1156

.5671

.5295

.1490

%WHEAT was significantly negatively related at
the 11.6 percent level to perceptions of landlords’
supportiveness of no-till and crop diversity. This
provides some modest preliminary evidence that
diversified farmers (less wheat) have experienced
a more positive reception by landlords to no-till.
Some research has shown that diversified cropping fosters no-till success (Boerboom et al.,
1993). One producer with only 33% wheat reports, “It is important to show landlords cost and
yield comparison against conventional systems.
[Provide] good communication and education by
the renter and get the landlord involved. Show
them with pictures and tours of their land.”
The only other variable with even modest statistical
support is that farmers with cash LEASE have a
more optimistic view of landlords’ approval of notill. This seems plausible because with cash leases
landlords are shouldering less risk if no-till fails.
One producer with all cash leases reports “Information and education. Most of my landlords are absen120

tee with little knowledge of agriculture. Mostly interested in environment and their finances.”
Overall, EDUC, SIZE, %WHEAT, and %RENT were
negatively associated with perceptions of landlord
supportiveness of no-till; however, EDUC and
%RENT displayed very low levels of statistical significance. LEASE and %RENT_REL responded positively to landlord encouraging no-till, but the latter
had an unacceptable statistical significance level.
In addition to %RENT_REL being non-significant
statistically testimony of respondents was mixed
regarding landlord encouragement of no-till. One
respondent with 100% of his cropland crop-share
rented, 90% from relatives, cited landlords as a discouraging influence to no-till because “They want
to guarantee that their income doesn’t change, and
they cannot withstand criticism from neighbors or
coffee clutches.” Another grower who leased 75%
of his farm acreage and zero percent from relatives
stated, “My landlord has been very positive and
behind me in my direct seeding program.”
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2.3. Landlords. Seventy two percent of the 11 surveyed landlords favored no-till as an advantageous
practice (Table 4) while 28% of the landlords considered no-till as a disadvantageous practice. Of
landlords considering no-till as advantageous about
75% reported that one of the primary benefits of
more intensive rotations or no-till was “erosion control.” One landlord reports that “Advantages are
conserve soil – less cultivating – we have steep hills
and clay knolls. This supplies nutrients to the soil
and prevents erosion”. Interestingly 67% of those
viewing no-till as disadvantageous also reported
erosion control as an advantage, but felt that “risk”
and “weed infestation” made more intensive rotations or no-till unappealing.
However, many landlords saw a mix of advantages
and disadvantages. For example, one landlord wholeases 2000 acres, crop-shares and is 67% wheat, cites
that benefits are “More acres in crop, better crop if it
rains” and disadvantages “when rainfall low, yields are

low.” While another landlord that leases 150 acres,
67% wheat with a crop-share lease states “Advantages
should have better soil on the farm, should have less
erosion. We might make more money with a more
intensive rotation. Disadvantages, will my present
tenant be able to keep up with a rapidly changing
learning curve? Will I end up with weed problems a
future tenant will not be able to control?”
Sixty two and half percent of landlords who favored
no-till reported using crop-share leases, whereas
100% of those who disfavored the practice reported
using crop-share leases (Table 4). When landlords
were asked, “If one of your renters wished to switch
to a more intensive rotation from a less intensive
rotation on one or more of your leases, please describe any change in lease terms you would permit
upon switching.” 37.5% of respondents favoring notill reported no change in lease terms, 37.7% would
negotiate, 12.5% already required spring cropping,
and 12.5% might negotiate on spring crops.

Table 4. Comparison of attribute averages for landlords who favor and disfavor no-till
Attributes

Unit

Landlord categories
Favors no-till*

Disfavors no-till*

Change in crop rents with no-till adoption (decrease)

%

3

0

Crop-share lease

%

63

100

17

21

%

58

44

1619

765

2

1

Rainfall (av in/yr)

Inch

Wheat
Acres rented

Acres

Known landlords with no-tilling renters

Number

Rented to relatives

%

Home to farm distance

Miles

Age (landlord)

Years

Male
Sample size

%
Number

25

0

60

12

56

55

63

100

8

3

Note: * indicates landlord’s perception about more advantages or disadvantages in switching to no-till or more intensive crop rotations.

Landlords were asked “Some argue that no-tilling
increases the long-run quality and productivity of the
land by limiting erosion and boosting organic matter.
What percentage reduction in annual cropland rents, if
any, would this long run land quality improvement be
worth to you?” 37.5% of landlords favoring no-till
reported willingness to make an average reduction of
8.5% in lease rent, while 62.5% of those favoring notill indicated no willingness to change lease rent. One
landlord that rents out 4000 acres, and reported no
willingness to change lease rent, stated, “Direct
seeding should be a better method to farm costing
less to the farmer. We would expect our farmers to
use the latest farming techniques and always use the
best available farming methods. We should both
benefit.” Not surprisingly, no landlords disfavoring
no-till indicated a willingness to decrease their rent
with no-till.

Other questions included in landlord questionnaire
were: lease type, rainfall on their land, % wheat on
their land, number of leases, acres rented, number of
landlords known with no-tilling renters, % rented to
relatives, distance from landlord’s home to farm, age,
and gender (Table 4). Landlords favoring no-till had
higher %WHEAT cropped, more crop-share leases,
greater acres rented, more other landlords known
who had no-tilling renters, and greater home to farm
distance. Landlords disfavoring no-till had higher
rainfall and were 100% male.
Conclusions
Size of farm, percentage of the farm in wheat, and
having a cash lease were the three most significant
variables influencing farmers’ perceptions about landlords’ disposition toward no-till. The first two were
negatively correlated and the last was positively correlated. Generally, farmers were more pessimistic re121
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garding landlords’ acceptance of no-till than were
landlords themselves. Only 44 percent of surveyed
farmers saw landlords as favoring no-till, but 72
percent of landlords characterized themselves as
favoring no-till. However, fewer landlords reported
willingness to cut rents to tenants who no-tilled their
land. Perhaps landlords’ general support for no-till
was offset in tenants’ eyes by their reluctance to
offer concrete incentives for no-till adoption. This
might underlie farmer pessimism regarding landlords’ support for the practice.
Currently farmers and landlords generally agree that
more intensive rotations or no-till can increase soil
quality and decrease erosion. Income risk and uncer-

tainty seem to be problems for bothlandlords and
tenants regarding more intensive rotations or no-till.
Both see potential income risk while landlords also
perceive future weed problems. Some tenants feel
landlords need to be educated on the benefits of
more intensive rotations or no-till. The large percentage of crop share leases indicates landlords desire to be involved in the risk of farming. Over time,
with more successes with these new cropping systems, more landlords may become convinced of
their value and offer incentives for their adoption.
Future research should consider both landlord and
producer objectives in developing conservation
farming technologies that appeal to both groups.
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